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Ghim Li Garments closed their factories in Nadi, Ba, and Lautoka, Fiji,
in April 2005, throwing more than three thousand employees out of work
and indirectly hurting business for bus companies, food-stall owners, and
taxi drivers. Thousands more garment workers were expected to lose their
jobs in 2006 following Fiji’s apparent failure to renegotiate the terms of
the South Paciﬁc Trade and Economic Agreement with Australia and New
Zealand (sparteca) (PIR 2006c). In April 2006 insurgents attacked a
supply convoy headed for the US airbase in Kirkuk, Iraq, killing four Fiji-
ans: Kelemedi Dreuvakabalawa of Nauluvatu Village, Nakelo; Malakai
Sekibureta of Naimasimasi Village, Tailevu; Iosefo Cagi of Vatulili, Naita-
siri; and Anasa Navukaro of Navuniivi, Ra (PIR 2006b). They were four
of more than a thousand Fijians in Iraq’s privatized security industry,
working for companies contracted mainly by the US military. In the same
month hundreds of young men gathered at the parliament building in
Honiara, capital of Solomon Islands, to see who would become prime
minister. When they realized it was Snyder Rini, a politician renowned for
corruption, they hurled abuse, threw stones, torched a police vehicle,
and, in the hours that followed, rampaged through Honiara in a riot that
left Chinatown mostly destroyed. 
These events, unconnected to each other, are related directly or indi-
rectly to the phenomenon we call globalization, and the areas of economic
and political life they exemplify—trade, labor, and security—are where
globalization is having its most transformative effects in the Paciﬁc. These
areas are the subjects of this article. 
Globalization, David Held has argued, “refers to a shift or transfor-
mation in the scale of human organization that links distant communities
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and expands the reach of power relations across the world’s regions. This
shift can be mapped by examining the expanding scale, growing magni-
tude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental ﬂows and
patterns of social interaction” (2004, 1). Here I concentrate on the eco-
nomic dimensions of this shift. Globalization in this narrower, economic
sense is characterized by intensiﬁed transactions across national borders
and is made possible by governments adopting the neoliberal policies in
vogue for the last quarter century. The economic advisers and consultants
who are so thick on the ground in the Paciﬁc Islands preach this neolib-
eral policy message. They come from foreign governments, aid agencies,
international ﬁnancial institutions, regional organizations, and some non-
governmental organizations. Paciﬁc Island governments, having little
alternative, endorse what they recommend. 
We should remember that economics, while it claims authority on the
basis of technical expertise, is in fact a branch of political philosophy
favoring one political outcome over another. The technical recommenda-
tion of neoliberal economics, for example, is to give freer rein to market
forces in economic life, to privatize public enterprises, to ﬂoat currencies,
to replace protection with free trade, and to reduce the freedoms enjoyed
by organized labor while enlarging the freedoms of capital. As became
clear after the World Trade Organization (wto) was formed in 1995,
globalization is also a project aimed at extending property rights over
new areas such as ideas, inventions, and biological life. Once we translate
technical into political, we ﬁnd that neoliberal economists are saying that
corporate power should be enhanced and that wealth and income should
be distributed more unequally because this is the only route to rapid eco-
nomic growth. A more unequal distribution of incomes has certainly
emerged in the last twenty-ﬁve years in the United States, where “the
share of aggregate income going to the highest-earning 1% of Americans
has doubled from 8% in 1980 to over 16% in 2004. That going to the
top tenth of 1% has tripled from 2% in 1980 to 7% today” (Economist
2006). Neoliberal economic globalization, in other words, is not taking
place in a political vacuum but in circumstances shaped by culture and
history, and in particular by the contemporary predominance in global
affairs of the United States. 
This observation applies to the impact of globalization on the Paciﬁc
Islands. The culture, history, politics, and demography of the Paciﬁc
Islands cannot be ignored in the debate about globalization, because they
are shaping its forms and effects in this part of the world.
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Trade and Regional Economic Integration
The global move from protection to free trade has reached the Paciﬁc
Islands. (For a critical analysis, see Kelsey 2004 and Kelsey 2005.) Lead-
ers of the Forum Island States (that is, the 14 Paciﬁc Island countries in
the Forum, excluding the 2 others, Australia and New Zealand) commit-
ted themselves in 1999 to negotiating a regional free-trade area and even-
tually reached a Paciﬁc Island Countries Trade Agreement (picta), which
came into effect in 2003. The geographical scope of this agreement is the
Island Paciﬁc; it covers trade only in goods, not services; and it provides
that the 5 developing Forum Island countries will remove all tariffs and
restrictions by 2010, while the 9 small island states and least developed
countries will do so by 2012. With detailed provisions about rules of ori-
gin, most-favored-nation treatment, trade distorting measures, and even
dumping, picta appears to be a signiﬁcant regional extension of global
free trade. Yet, like many poor countries, the Forum Island states sell lit-
tle to each other. The agreement covers a tiny percentage of their trade,
which is mostly with the rest of the world, especially with Australia and
New Zealand. picta will not change much in the way Island economies
work, except perhaps to concentrate breweries and tobacco manufacture
in a few countries. 
Why, then, have the Island countries bothered to negotiate free trade
among themselves? The answer is that Island countries are seeking to
reassure aid donors and the institutions of global governance that they
are adapting to the new global trading order. The plan for a free-trade
area signaled the region’s willingness to consider new measures for deal-
ing with globalization and trade liberalization through regional integra-
tion. In any case, picta is merely a stepping-stone to comprehensive free-
trade initiatives that will have a far greater impact on the economic
prospects of the Island countries and the working lives of their people. 
The ﬁrst of these initiatives concerns the region’s two largest trading
partners, Australia and New Zealand, and is called the Paciﬁc Agreement
on Closer Economic Relations (pacer). Whereas picta mandates free
trade only among the Island countries of the Forum, pacer, in effect since
2002, provides for the eventual extension of the regional free-trade area
to Australia and New Zealand. Under pacer provisions, Forum Island
countries must enter into free-trade and economic integration negotiations
with Australia and New Zealand no later than eight years after picta
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entered into force, that is, by 2011, and in any case when the Island states
begin negotiating over free trade with any country or group of countries
that have a higher per capita income than New Zealand. This last provi-
sion for a trigger is designed to ensure that Australia and New Zealand
are not disadvantaged by the Islands’ trade arrangements with the Euro-
pean Union (eu), since these are also changing and are headed ﬁrmly in
the direction of free trade. The Island countries began free-trade talks
with the European Union in 2004, a process that is expected to lead to
pacer talks with Australia and New Zealand in a few years’ time. 
The pacer goal is to “establish a framework for the gradual trade and
economic integration of the economies of the Forum members in a way
that is fully supportive of sustainable development of the Forum Island
Countries and to contribute to their gradual and progressive integration
into the international economy” by developing a single regional market
(Australian Parliament 2002, para 8). The phrase “Forum members” is
important, because it includes Australia and New Zealand, which under
pacer terms will seek to integrate the Island economies with their own
in a comprehensively liberalized trade and investment regime. While the
process will be gradual, the end effect will be that pacer will overtake
picta and incorporate Island countries into a free-trade area dominated
by Australia and New Zealand. 
The second free-trade initiative now being negotiated in the Paciﬁc
Islands is with the European Union. The impetus for the European Union
to change its aid and trade relationship with the Paciﬁc Islands came
when the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
concluded in 1994 and the World Trade Organization was established
soon afterward. The Uruguay Round expanded the deﬁnition of what
“trade” was, by covering a wide range of trade in services, and at the
same time extended copyright protection internationally into new areas
such as intellectual property. The World Trade Organization, which has
the task of administering and enforcing the growing body of multilateral
trade agreements, is a key institution of globalization and free trade. The
outcome, according to the European Union, was “a new multilateral con-
text which is speeding up a globalization of the economy driven by tech-
nological change and the liberalization of economic policies that started
in the 1980s” (ec 1996, i). 
The “new multilateral context” of globalization and liberalization com-
pelled a fundamental reconsideration by the European Union of its rela-
tions with the countries of the Africa, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc Group
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(acp). The time had come for “breathing fresh life into the acp-eu part-
nership and recharging it with the relevance and effectiveness needed to
face up to the challenges of the 21st century,” according to the experts in
Brussels, and in a 1996 eu Green Paper they declared where they wanted
the partnership to go (ec 1996). The destination was globalization, and
the European Union’s role was now to assist developing countries to inte-
grate into the global economy. The state in developing countries was no
longer to undertake development itself, but rather to create the condi-
tions for proﬁtable private enterprise, as the economy moved from being
regulated and protected to being open to international pressures. The eu
vision of a successful economy was ﬁrmly neoliberal: “Macroeconomic
stability, realistic and stable exchange rates, good institutions and good
governance, and efﬁcient resource allocation policies, in particular stable
and credible import and taxation regimes, as well as reduced trade pro-
tection, which allow a transparent transmission of world price signals to
domestic producers, are signiﬁcant determinants of competitiveness and
hence of export performance. These supply-side factors are now consid-
ered much more important than trade preferences in achieving high rates
of export and economic growth” (ec 1996, 17–18). Aid would become
more conditional, and the key condition would be good governance in
aid-recipient states. Free trade would replace preferential trade, and the
European Union would negotiate free-trade agreements separately with
different parts of the developing world. 
The consequences of this shift in eu policy continue to reverberate
throughout the developing world, not least in the acp countries, which,
from the 1970s, came under the provisions of successive versions of the
Lomé Convention. The Africa, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc Group dates from
1975, when a group of 46 former European colonies negotiated a special
trade and aid relationship with the European Community, then recently
enlarged by the addition of the United Kingdom. By 2006 acp member-
ship had expanded to 79, including East Timor, and the total population
to more than 740 million people, mostly in Africa. The original 8 Paciﬁc
member states were Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Sämoa, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu—all former colonial territories of
Britain, France, or Germany, at one time or another—and a further 6
joined in 2000: Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, the Marshall Islands, the Fed-
erated States of Micronesia, and Palau. 
By far the most important Lomé trade arrangement in the Paciﬁc was
the Sugar Protocol, which gave Fiji sugar preferential access to Europe at
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a generous price. The Sugar Protocol was annexed to the Lomé Conven-
tion in the mid-1970s, at a time when there was a shortage of sugar
worldwide and commodity-exporting developing countries were brieﬂy in
a strong bargaining position. The protocol provides for 19 acp countries
(Barbados, Belize, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, St Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Swazi-
land, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)
to supply the European Community with agreed quantities of cane sugar
at guaranteed prices. Each of these countries holds quotas, and Fiji is
among the 5 largest quota-holders. The eu Council decides annually what
the guaranteed prices for raw sugar and white sugar will be. In effect, the
Sugar Protocol with acp countries gives developing countries in the
Caribbean, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Paciﬁc a price for sugar that
matches the one paid to domestic producers within Europe, and in this
way it is linked to the European Union’s own, internal sugar regime, which
dates from 1968 and is part of the Common Agricultural Policy. At a cost
now running at 1.217 billion euros a year, the eu sugar regime guaran-
tees prices for sugar grown within the 21 sugar-growing countries of the
eu-25 (all of the expanded European Union except for Luxembourg,
Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta), of which the most important are France and
Germany. Europe, as a result, is a major sugar producer (Gillson, Hewitt,
and Page 2005).
The Sugar Protocol, unlike the rest of Lomé, originated as a permanent
arrangement, not one that was subject to regular review, and in theory it
could continue indeﬁnitely. The protocol’s terms were not changed when
Cotonou replaced Lomé, though technically it was now a Cotonou pro-
tocol. Those terms, however, allowed either side of the arrangement—the
European Union or the acp Protocol countries—to withdraw with two
years’ notice, and the European Union is now in the process of bringing
the Protocol to an end. The pressure on the European Union to change
comes from the global move to free trade led by the World Trade Orga-
nization and from the long-standing criticism that European agriculture
survives on the massive subsidies of the Common Agricultural Policy.
Some countries object in particular to eu export subsidies on sugar, and
Australia joined Brazil and Thailand in challenging these subsidies at the
World Trade Organization, claiming they were in breach of the European
Union’s wto obligations. The World Trade Organization agreed, and
ruled against the European Union in 2004. Since the Sugar Protocol is, in
essence, an overseas extension of the eu internal sugar regime, changes to
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that regime threaten the Protocol, and the acp Protocol countries now
confront globalization in the form of free trade in sugar.
The implications of this change are profound for Fiji, where thousands
of small farmers depend on a sugar industry that survives largely on Euro-
pean price support. The structure of the Fiji sugar industry dates from the
1920s, when the Colonial Sugar Reﬁning Company moved sugar grow-
ing from plantations to smallholdings of ten acres each. Plantation labor-
ers, mostly of Indian descent, became small farmers, tied to the company
by agreements that dictated how much they would grow and what the
price would be. And when Colonial Sugar sold out to the Fiji government
in 1973, the state-owned Fiji Sugar Corporation inherited the same small-
holding production system, complete with aging mills, machinery, rail-
ways, rail stock, and other infrastructure. The four sugar mills owned by
the Fiji Sugar Corporation—at Rakiraki, Ba, Lautoka, and Labasa—all
date from the nineteenth century, and have mostly made losses since 1997.
More than that, the Fiji Sugar Corporation inherited an industry highly
resistant to change. 
Fiji without sugar seems inconceivable. People see sugar as the foun-
dation of the country’s wealth, and there is a “widespread belief through-
out the industry that the sugar industry will not be allowed to fail because
the stakes are too high” (Reddy 2003, 271). The government has fostered
this belief by lending money to the Fiji Sugar Corporation and then, when
it cannot repay, converting the loans into grants. Fiji sugar production has
declined in recent years, but the industry still employs more than 20,000
people in cultivation with another 24,000 involved in cane cutting, trans-
port, and milling. Fiji, together with Guyana, Mauritius, Swaziland, and
Belize, stands to lose most among acp countries from the end of prefer-
ential access to the eu sugar market, both in absolute terms and in pro-
portion to gross domestic product (gdp) and export income (Gillson,
Hewitt, and Page 2005, 54). As accountancy expert Michael White has
soberly concluded, “it is by no means certain that Fiji’s sugar industry will
be ﬁnancially viable if it no longer enjoys preferential access to certain
markets, even if it is able to successfully restructure. . . . The most appro-
priate policy to pursue may well be one that enables the orderly winding
down of the industry and its ultimate closure” (White 2003, 299).
The question might well be asked: Why did Fiji not restructure the
sugar industry earlier? The writing, after all, has been on the wall for a
decade, and a succession of observers, advisers, and eu representatives has
been pointing to the urgent need for reform for years. The answer lies
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partly in politics and partly in the Fiji bureaucracy. The sugar industry in
Fiji is highly politicized, and in a way that has blocked reform. Sugar sus-
tains a whole way of life in western Viti Levu and parts of Vanua Levu—
the only way of life many farmers can imagine—and defending the inter-
ests of the farmers has become a key political resource for Indo-Fijian
politicians, not least for the former Labor Party prime minister over-
thrown in 2000, Mahendra Chaudhry. On the other hand, Fijian politi-
cians such as Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase have posed as defenders of
the rights of the Fijian landowners from whom the land is leased at a time
when land leases dating from the 1970s have been expiring. While both
sides have done battle over sugar, neither has focused on the more fun-
damental issue of whether it has a future. The Speight coup of 2000 exac-
erbated these tensions between the country’s two major communities and
diverted people’s attention from what needed to be done for the nation as
a whole. The major restructuring of an economy would tax the energies
of any government—and most of all, those of the government of an Island
nation such as Fiji, which is too small to possess the depth of bureaucratic
expertise to sustain a project of this kind. There are highly talented indi-
viduals in the Fiji bureaucracy with an impressive command of these
issues—one thinks of Isikeli Mataitoga, ceo of Fiji’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and External Trade, for example—but there are not enough of
them.
The coming demise of the Sugar Protocol, then, will transform the Fiji
economy over the coming decade. The change is beginning. The Euro-
pean Union is cutting the import price for preferential raw sugar imports
by at least 37 percent over three years from 1 July 2005 and will reduce
quotas as well. In all likelihood, the special import price will disappear
altogether sometime after 2008, and the Fiji sugar industry will have to
sink or swim at the much lower world price. 
The European Union is considering transitional assistance for countries
affected by free trade, and is likely to assist restructuring rather than pay
compensation to farmers. As a 2005 British report points out, this “could
include measures to increase the competitiveness of the declining sector
(including branding and niche marketing opportunities) or developing
and marketing related products e.g. ethanol from sugar. Niche markets
(such as Fair Trade or organics) provide a price premium which could
allow some acp Protocol countries to maintain production.” However,
the report warns, “these approaches may be unable to preserve signiﬁcant
levels of output for those countries whose long-term competitiveness is in
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decline. In the long run, diversiﬁcation into other activities is the best
strategy for high cost acp Protocol countries” (Gillson, Hewitt, and Page
2005, 5). Given that Fiji’s competitiveness as a sugar producer has been
declining in recent years, the corollary is that the sugar industry can sur-
vive there only in radically restructured form, if at all. 
The Fiji sugar industry will probably decline slowly rather than col-
lapse overnight. It will not end abruptly, as happened in 2005 on the
Caribbean island of St Kitts. The Fiji sugar mills are being modernized
and re-equipped according to the recommendations of a technical mis-
sion sent by the government of India, and sugar will survive temporarily
on lifelines of this kind. The eu transitional package will temporarily
soften the blow of lower sugar prices. The Fiji government will be under
intense political pressure not to let sugar fail and, as in the past, it will
prop up the Fiji Sugar Corporation. Efforts will be made to diversify into
products such as ethanol, and farmers will win temporary reprieves from
failure when the world sugar price rises, as it did in 2006. A permanently
higher world price—the only development that could actually rescue Fiji
sugar—should, in theory, follow from abolishing subsidies and preferen-
tial arrangements, but even if that happens, the global sugar market is
likely to remain distorted. The European Union is contesting the wto
ruling against export subsidies on sugar, for example, ensuring the subsi-
dies continue for some years; and, even though sugar will be reformed
within Europe, the European Union will not impose neoliberal solutions
on itself with the enthusiasm it has imposed them on others. For Fiji, the
future threatens a dislocation of the sugar industry that is likely to exac-
erbate urbanization, as farmers who fail to ﬁnd alternative crops move as
squatters to the Suva–Nausori corridor and place further strain on urban
infrastructure. An estimated 90,000 people are now living in squatter set-
tlements in the Suva–Nausori corridor, with many more likely to come.
One observer suggests, “Fiji may only be at the edge of a signiﬁcant and
potentially chaotic urban demographic explosion for which it is barely
prepared” (Storey 2006, 20).
Fiji is also experiencing the end of another wto-incompatible trade
regime originating in the 1970s, the Multi Fibre Arrangement (mfa),
which expired at the beginning of 2005. The expiry of this arrangement,
under which Fiji exported garments to the United States, affected only a
few companies, but it has nevertheless delivered a blow to an industry that
earns more for Fiji than sugar and employs about 14,000 people, many
of them women whose cash income is a major part of family earnings. As
120 the contemporary pacific • 19:1 (2007)
we have seen, Ghim Li Garments was especially affected by the end of the
Multi Fibre Arrangement and closed in 2005 with the loss of 3,000 jobs.
Between 2004 and 2005 the output of Fiji’s garment and footwear indus-
tries fell by 55 percent (PIR 2006a). The loss of these exports, a direct con-
sequence of globalization, has contributed substantially to halving Fiji’s
growth rate from more than 4 percent in 2004 to a predicted 2 percent
in 2006 (Reserve Bank of Fiji 2005). The Fiji garment industry now relies
even more than before on the weakening reed of sparteca, recently
renewed for another seven years. sparteca allows duty-free entry into
Australia and New Zealand of certain manufactured goods from the
Forum Island Countries, including garments from Fiji, but the Paciﬁc’s
margin of advantage is declining as Australia and New Zealand reduce
their tariffs on garments and other goods from the rest of the world. As
further job losses in the garment industry loomed in 2006, Fiji Foreign
Minister Kaliopate Tavola complained that tens of thousands of people
in Fiji had become “victims of the lack of morals and equity in global eco-
nomic development” (PIR 2006c). The future for the Fiji garment indus-
try will lie in developing niche markets where there is less competition
from China. 
To put these developments in perspective, we should note that global-
ization is also creating opportunities for Fiji, above all in an expanding
tourist industry, in services such as call centers, and in a sudden growth
in labor migration. Fiji has the region’s most diversiﬁed economy, and the
2006 elections gave promise of political stability, so the country may
emerge stronger from restructuring in the long term. My contention here
is simply that globalization has forced a restructuring that, at least in the
short term, is likely to have negative social effects. 
For Paciﬁc Islanders in general, an important effect of the coming of
free trade will be higher indirect taxes. Tariffs are an important source of
government revenue for all Paciﬁc Island countries, and their loss will
compel governments to seek revenue elsewhere in indirect taxes, espe-
cially by increasing the rate at which they are levied. Some countries that
currently do not have a value-added tax are contemplating introducing
one in order to compensate for the loss of income from tariffs. 
At the same time Australia and New Zealand have encouraged the
Paciﬁc Islands Forum to embark upon a long-term strategy of regional
economic integration under what is called the “Paciﬁc Plan” in order to
enhance regional security and make the region competitive in a globaliz-
ing age (www.paciﬁcplan.org). The Paciﬁc Islands Forum endorsed the
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Paciﬁc Plan in 2005, and is now committed to regional integration by
2015. As a concept, the plan at ﬁrst seemed pathbreaking. Paciﬁc leaders
did not mince words, pointing out that poor governance had produced
“instability, violence, corruption and a breakdown of the democratic
process,” leading to slow economic growth and in some countries eco-
nomic decline, and that globalization was a major challenge to which the
plan would respond. There was talk of “regional integration deeper than
that already established under current trade arrangements,” of sharing
the resources of governance, and of engaging in new thinking about “the
relationships between sovereign states” (epg 2004). Reading between the
lines, some observers thought the Paciﬁc Plan might eventually lead to a
common Forum area currency and monetary authority like the euro and
the European Central Bank. 
To date, the Paciﬁc Plan adopted by the Forum falls far short of such
transformation. The focus instead is on minor initiatives that constitute
only a ﬁrst step toward regional integration. Crucially, these initiatives
must meet the “sovereignty test,” placing strict limits on regional policy
making. The plan charts a careful course around the shoals of Paciﬁc
Islands sovereignty, and is characteristically a Forum document both in
devotion to what is desirable—more trade and investment, better gover-
nance, sustainable development, participatory democracy, greater secu-
rity, a halt to the spread of hiv/aids and so on—and caution in real
commitments. There is much to commend in the aims of the Paciﬁc Plan,
and some things will happen—better police training, for example, and an
agreement on the temporary migration of labor from one Island state to
another—but initial changes will be small-scale. Still, the Paciﬁc Plan is a
ten-year process as well as an immediate set of commitments, and more
thoroughgoing movement toward regional economic integration might
yet come. By 2008 the Forum plans to have integrated trade in services,
“including temporary movement of labour,” into the Paciﬁc Island Coun-
tries Trade Agreement, and into the Economic Partnership Agreement
with the European Union (pif 2005b, para 13). The Forum also plans to
investigate the impact on Island countries of a comprehensive agreement
on trade and services with Australia and New Zealand under the Paciﬁc
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations. “As successful regionalism
requires larger markets to stimulate growth,” the plan explains, “part-
nership with Australia and New Zealand is crucial for Paciﬁc regionalism
to be viable” (pif 2005b, para 16). The new vision of Paciﬁc Islands
regionalism, then, is one that creates a Paciﬁc Islands common market
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and economic community embracing all Forum states including Australia
and New Zealand. Given the economic and political dominance of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in the Forum region, their inclusion in this vision
suggests a future regionalism even more ﬁrmly directed by governments
in Canberra and Wellington than it is now. 
Labor Migration
The relationship between globalization and labor migration is compli-
cated. Widening global inequalities make people in poor countries desper-
ate for jobs in rich ones, as can be seen from the endless stream of Latin
Americans trying to enter the United States across its southern border, the
desperate attempts by Africans to reach Europe from Morocco or Libya,
and the huge number of Filipinos working overseas. In a truly globalized
world economy—one that matched the rhetoric of the globalizers—labor
would cross national borders as easily as capital, as happened before
World War I in the case of European migration to the United States. In
reality, migration is a politically sensitive issue throughout the rich world,
and the governments of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (oecd) countries regulate it in the most exacting and strin-
gent ways, in sharp contradiction to ofﬁcial rhetoric claiming that glob-
alization is about deregulation. Such is particularly the case in Australia,
which places all illegal immigrants, including asylum seekers, in detention
centers where they may remain for years until their cases are heard. 
The impact of globalization on Paciﬁc Islands labor migration needs to
be seen in this political context. For years Paciﬁc Islanders have migrated
from the Island states and territories to Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
and the United States. Wherever people have had automatic right to entry
to a metropolitan state (as do Micronesians to the United States or Cook
Islanders and Niueans to New Zealand), they have left their home coun-
tries in droves, giving lie to the idea that life in the Islands is idyllic. Else-
where, people also leave if they can. For the last ﬁfteen years the leading
remittance economies in the region have been Sämoa and Tonga, where
roughly half the population lives abroad. Many Samoans and Tongans
have migrated to New Zealand, which now has a sizable Paciﬁc Islander
population, and their remittances have become a vital contribution to
national income. In the last four years Fiji has joined Tonga and Sämoa
as a remittance economy, as thousands of Fijians have joined the British
Army or been recruited as private security guards. Since the beginning of
the war on Iraq, companies such as Global Risk Strategies, Homeland
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Security Limited, Triple Canopy, and Sabre International Security Fiji have
sent hundreds of former soldiers and police to Iraq to serve as escorts and
guards (Maclellan 2006). Many more are being recruited by other secu-
rity companies and some have been killed in the line of duty. As Fiji’s
Reserve Bank Governor points out:
Personal remittances have become a prominent source of foreign exchange for
Fiji. Personal remittances have surged to $300 million in 2004, compared to a
mere $50 million ﬁve years ago. Remittances are now equivalent to 7 percent
of gdp and that is more than many of our traditional economic sectors. They
have also displaced garments and sugar on their rise to become the second
largest source of foreign exchange earnings for Fiji. Furthermore, we are only
capturing remittances that ﬂow through the ﬁnancial system. There are others
that are carried in person and sent through the ordinary mail. There are also
those remittances in kind. One estimate puts these unrecorded remittances at
over $150 million lifting total remittances above retained tourist receipts.
These remittances have come at an opportune time for us, with our exports
not performing well. They have given us much-needed breathing space. Every-
one should say thank you to all our peacekeepers, security personnel, nurses,
sportspersons and family members abroad for helping us pay for our imports.
(Narube 2005)
The hunger for cash incomes among Fijians could be seen in Suva as word
spread of opportunities in Iraq in 2004, and queues of prospective guards
gathered in hundreds at the recruiting headquarters of the security com-
panies in Suva. In this case the driving force behind the exodus of Fijians
has been another phenomenon of the globalizing era, the privatization of
security and the outsourcing of military support tasks by the US Armed
Forces in Iraq. 
There is another kind of emigration from Fiji, the permanent departure
of people of Indian descent, most of whom are highly skilled and well
educated. It can be called “ethnic emigration” and is driven in part by the
pull of job opportunities in globalizing economies nearby, and in part by
the push of political instability. For years after independence in 1970 a
steady ﬂow of skilled and educated Indo-Fijians left their home country in
search of a better life overseas. The military coups of 1987, executed in the
name of keeping Fiji for the indigenous Fijians, led to a much greater
outﬂow of people, and the attempted coup by George Speight in 2000 left
no Indo-Fijians in doubt that their future in the country of their birth is
precarious. That is why more than 100,000 people have left Fiji perma-
nently since 1987, and why 90 percent of them are Indo-Fijians (Mohanty
2005).1 They are now industrious Australians, New Zealanders, Ameri-
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cans, and Canadians, contributing their skills to successful oecd econ-
omies and returning to Fiji only as tourists. 
Yet labor migration is by no means universal in the Paciﬁc. Only small
numbers migrate to the rich world from its most heavily populated sub-
region—Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Fewer peo-
ple in these countries than in Fiji, Sämoa, or Tonga possess the education
or skills to qualify for entry into the English-speaking countries of the
Paciﬁc Rim, or, for that matter, the military training that would ﬁt them
for employment in the privatized security industry. 
The logic of globalization suggests that Australia and New Zealand
should offer easier access to unskilled Paciﬁc Islanders, as seasonal work-
ers even if not as permanent migrants. An Australian Senate committee
has recommended a seasonal worker scheme for Paciﬁc Islanders, who
would enter Australia on short-term visas to pick fruit and undertake
other agricultural work, as many already do illegally (Australian Senate
2003). After all, if free trade is going to allow goods, services, and capi-
tal from Australia and New Zealand into the Islands unhindered, why
not allow unskilled Paciﬁc Islanders temporary entry to the labor markets
of those countries? That is the argument now being advanced by Paciﬁc
Islands leaders keen to ﬁnd employment for their populations, and by the
World Bank, which describes the climate as “right to offer consideration
of the merits of some form of labor market integration” of Paciﬁc Islands
countries with their “Paciﬁc neighbors” (World Bank 2005, 18). The
Paciﬁc Islands Forum is saying the same thing, resolving to “continue to
consider the issue of labor mobility in the context of member countries’
immigration policies” (pif 2005a). But the atmosphere of domestic poli-
tics in Australia runs counter to this proposal. By depicting itself as shield-
ing citizens from the hordes who wish to enter their homeland the Howard
government has exploited popular fears of illegal immigration and won
votes, and by overturning a century’s tradition of protective labor law and
high minimum wages it has aroused trade union suspicions of foreign
workers. The Howard government has therefore rejected the seasonal
Paciﬁc Islander worker idea. 
Regional Security
Globalization and regional security in the Paciﬁc Islands might at ﬁrst be
regarded as distinct from each other, one driven by global economic and
technological changes, the other arising from the local political circum-
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stances of Island states. Yet, in at least one case, globalization has proved
politically destabilizing and a threat to regional security—or, to put it
more accurately, globalization has been a signiﬁcant element among oth-
ers in producing political destabilization. As Australia Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer has said, “the spread of economic globalization brings
great potential beneﬁts—but only if countries can develop strong and
resilient institutions, and maintain prudent economic policies. These are
preoccupations of developed and developing countries alike. But for devel-
oping countries, the risks are particularly high. Hard-won economic gains
can be quickly lost by the failure of institutions of governance, and the
spread of violence and corruption. The Paciﬁc has already produced one
stark example of this—Solomon Islands—and it is important that we pro-
duce no more” (2004).
Globalization in Solomon Islands has taken the form of unregulated
investment in tropical logging, the country’s principal export industry. In
one sense this exploitation of natural resources for the global market was
globalization in the old sense, familiar in the Paciﬁc since the nineteenth
century, but in another it was new, because the rate of exploitation
dwarfed anything the country had seen before as loggers moved from
Southeast Asia into the virgin forests of the Paciﬁc. An insatiable overseas
market for rain-forest timber drove investment at a frenzied and unsus-
tainable rate. In the two decades after independence from Britain in 1978,
the export of round logs by Asian timber companies not only boomed at
an ecologically unsustainable level, but also corrupted numerous political
leaders who allied themselves with foreign investors. In effect, the logging
companies bought whole governments, then systematically underreported
exports, while their friends in high ofﬁce legislated generous tax remis-
sions. The result was a fall in Solomon Islands government revenue and
a crisis in the national budget in the mid-1990s, leading to a structural
reform program backed by the International Monetary Fund, the Asian
Development Bank, and the World Bank. Under structural reform, a new
government dismissed hundreds of public servants and cut services, restor-
ing the budget balance while undermining political stability. 
Against this background of diminishing government effectiveness, inter-
nal migration was creating the conditions for disorder, as thousands of
people from Malaita, the Solomons’ most populous island, migrated to
Guadalcanal in search of the opportunities available in the seat of gov-
ernment at Honiara. Over a period of decades, the newcomers became
competitors with the locals for the land, resources, and jobs of Guadal-
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canal, and growing numbers of jobless young men formed an army of
ready recruits for anyone ready to give them a purpose. In 1998 Guadal-
canal militants embarked on a campaign of murder and arson to force
the Malaitans off their land, and in the following year the government
declared a state of emergency and repatriated thousands of Malaitans to
their home island. Tenuous ceaseﬁres reached in 1999 held temporarily,
but fundamental problems remained unresolved. 
The situation worsened in 2000, when the Malaitans formed their own
militia called the Malaita Eagle Force and overthrew the constitutionally
elected government, replacing the prime minister with one of their own
choosing. Fighting intensiﬁed in mid-2000, militants looted much of the
capital, and investors closed the country’s only gold mine. The economy
contracted by an estimated 25 percent in two years, and although a peace
agreement between the factions was reached in October 2000, peace
proved elusive. The police force now consisted mainly of Malaitans, used
its weapons to extort payments from government, and worked hand in
hand with those who were undermining the rule of law. Solomon Islands
was becoming a failed state (Dinnen 2002; Fraenkel 2004; Moore 2005).
At this point Australia reversed its long-standing policy of avoiding
direct intervention in the affairs of Island countries, and sent 1,600 sol-
diers and police to lead a regional intervention force. The Australian gov-
ernment described it as a “fundamental policy shift by Australia” that
“has sharpened the focus of engagement through necessity following the
deterioration of security in Solomon Islands and in the context of global
security and the understanding that a porous and undeveloped region is
not in the interests of Australia” (AusAID 2004a, 4). For the moment, the
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, while technically oper-
ating in support of the sovereign government in Honiara, has in effect
established a protectorate administration designed to rebuild the state in
that country. The limitations of such intervention became starkly appar-
ent, however, in the Honiara riots of April 2006, and the subsequent
dispatch of Australian troops. Snyder Rini was forced to step down in
favor of former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, but no one believes
the country therefore has a corruption-free future. Key decisions about
Solomon Islands will continue to be made in Canberra, where bureau-
crats and politicians direct the spending of almost a quarter of a billion
Australian dollars in annual aid ﬂows to the country.
No complex historical process is reducible to a formulaic explanation
in terms of one phenomenon. One cannot say the tensions in Solomon
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Islands arose simply from something called “globalization.” In its public
pronouncements on the issue, the Australian government said nothing
about the forestry industry and a great deal about the danger that Solo-
mon Islands could become an outlaw state serving as a haven for terror-
ists (Kabutaulaka 2005). Yet we cannot fully understand events in Solo-
mon Islands unless we recall the broader economic framework in which
they occurred, the corrupting form which foreign investment has taken in
that country, and the weakening of an already weak state that resulted.
Similar observations apply to Papua New Guinea (PNG), the largest
Melanesian country, and one that is struggling with the challenges of a
resource-based export economy in a globalized world. Papua New Guinea
has a high degree of dependence on copper, gold, oil, gas, and forestry,
with nickel and cobalt soon to be produced from the Ramu project con-
trolled by a Chinese metallurgical company. Work may soon begin on con-
structing a gas pipeline from the PNG Southern Highlands to Australia.
Australia is increasing aid considerably to Papua New Guinea after almost
thirty years as the country’s major aid donor, from a$334 million in
2003–04 to a$492 million in 2005–06. The situation for many Papua
New Guineans, especially rural villagers, is worse now than when the
country gained independence in 1975. Roads are poorer, malaria more
widespread, the health system in decline, crime more serious, unemploy-
ment levels higher, and hiv/aids an emerging threat. Many people in
Port Moresby and other urban centers fear for their safety. “The most
dramatic decline in PNG,” the Australian government concluded in 2004,
“has been in the quality of governance. The PNG government currently
supports a wide range of programs that are not affordable within current
budget parameters. Budget appropriations are often inadequate and
agencies rarely receive the funds that have been appropriated. The result
is that service delivery is limited and biased toward urban areas. The fun-
damental weakness of governance undermines investment by government,
the private sector and development cooperation partners, threatening both
prosperity and stability” (AusAID 2004b, 13).
One way of understanding the poor record of development in Papua
New Guinea is to see the country as suffering from a version of the
“resource curse,” in which a “rentier state” with abundant natural
resources lacks accountability to its citizens. As Jonathan DiJohn described
the argument: “The main premise of the rentier state model of governance
is that when states gain a large proportion of their revenues from exter-
nal sources, such as resource rents, the reduced necessity of state decision-
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makers to levy domestic taxes causes leaders to be less accountable to indi-
viduals and groups within civil society” (2002, 2). States that lack a deep
taxation relationship with their people have little need to respond to their
demands. In the PNG case, politicians certainly feel a need to respond to
the demands of voters, but mainly to the small subset of voters in each
electorate who happen to belong to the local representative’s kin group.
Strong but narrow loyalties within society are reproduced at the national
level in the political system, with results that do not favor the develop-
ment of the country as a whole. As with Solomon Islands, we cannot
blame all the ills of Papua New Guinea on globalization—the situation,
with its roots in culture and history, is too complex for that—yet at the
same time we cannot afford to ignore the global economic context in
which any PNG government works, in particular its dependence on for-
eign investors in resource projects for taxation and equity revenue. 
Threats to security in the Paciﬁc Islands, then, arise at least in part
from globalizing processes of various kinds, and from the way those pro-
cesses interact with Paciﬁc cultures and political systems. Australia’s new
engagement in the region, funded by a massive increase in aid to Papua
New Guinea and the rest of the Paciﬁc, is a response to those threats and
an attempt by Canberra bureaucrats to provide the region with survival
equipment for life in a globalized economy. In a broad sense it is a
response to globalization. Under Australia’s Enhanced Cooperation Pro-
gram, worth a$1.1 billion over the ﬁve years from 2004, Australians are
occupying key positions in the public service, and Australian federal
police are serving as advisers. Australia is becoming a hands-on supervi-
sor of governance reform in the South Paciﬁc, not only in Solomon Islands
and Papua New Guinea, but in Nauru and other states as well. In Can-
berra the departments of the attorney general, ﬁnance, and treasury have
established specialized South Paciﬁc units, and the Australian Federal
Police, who are playing an increasingly important role in the region, now
have an International Deployment Group. AusAID, the Australian aid
agency, has staff specializing in “fragile states” and how to make them
less fragile. 
Conclusion
One observer has seen “a vocal chorus . . . building within Fiji and the
broader Paciﬁc island region that is attributing many of the current eco-
nomic problems in the region to wto-sponsored multilateral trade liber-
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alization” and has argued that local policy choices made by Islands gov-
ernments are what matter in “how the beneﬁts or losses pan out for the
country” (Chand 2005, 124, 128). The argument that Islands govern-
ments should make the right policy choices is undeniable but shallow. In
theory, Islands governments should be adapting to the new globalization
order and taking the opportunities it offers. Fiji should have reformed
sugar years ago. The Solomon Islands government should have stood ﬁrm
against the logging industry, refused to give remissions on export duties,
and invested the returns in village development. Papua New Guinea
should have maintained internal security, kept the roads in good order,
and built an efﬁcient public service. Paciﬁc Islands economies would work
better if landownership were clearly established in law, if there were no
disputes over land, and if individuals and groups could use their land
assets as collateral to raise capital for investment. 
The problem is that these things do not happen, the important issue is
why that is the case, and the answers lie less in economic theory than in
culture, history, politics, and demography. 
For cultural reasons, economic growth of East Asian speed and propor-
tions is unlikely anywhere in the Paciﬁc Islands. Throughout the region,
chiefs and elites have enriched themselves handsomely by exploiting old
obligations in the cause of new accumulation, but the obligations—to
kin, to community, and to chiefs—remain strong. These have not yielded
sufﬁciently to individualism to create the entrepreneurial drive that,
according to economic theory, bursts forth in all cultural settings at the
ﬁrst sign of market forces. Itself a culturally bound ideology, neoliberal
economics proceeds on the basis of universalist assumptions about psy-
chology and human nature. The key assumption is that individuals are
self-maximizing and that market signals are the best way of triggering
their self-maximization, which, though private in nature, is said to be in
the public interest in the long run. Yet consider the following World Bank
analysis of Paciﬁc Islanders’ potential for entrepreneurship—in other
words, their propensity as individuals to seize market opportunities. Neo-
liberal assumptions about human nature in a free market setting do not
hold generally true, the bank argues, for Paciﬁc Islanders and Paciﬁc
Island cultures: 
Unlike the Indian Island and Caribbean countries to which they are sometimes
compared, Paciﬁc indigenous cultures have remained strong. . . . The existence
of a deﬁning sense of family, clan, and ethnic identity manifests itself in two
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signiﬁcant ways. First, social networks deﬁned by clan, and family relations
have done much to alleviate the harshest effects of poverty due to access to
communally owned land for subsistence agriculture, as well as strong social
norms to provide support to the needy in the community. Second, the primacy
of the community places social barriers against the development of a culture of
aggressive private entrepreneurship, as all successes (and failures) are viewed
as belonging to the family or clan. Moreover, these cultural standards mean
that there is generally widespread support for the involvement of the public
sector in many economic activities that in other countries would be regarded
as solely in the sphere of private activity. (World Bank 2005, 2–3)
The cultural story in the Paciﬁc is more complicated than this World Bank
characterization suggests. The restructuring of the Fiji sugar industry, for
example, is taking place largely in the context of a Fiji-Indian culture that
has proven more responsive to entrepreneurial opportunities than its
indigenous Fijian counterpart. Many Papua New Guineans have proven
to react swiftly to the lure of higher world prices for agricultural com-
modities. And, because of globalization, Paciﬁc “indigenous cultures” are
not static but constantly absorbing and adopting individualist values. The
bank’s central point, however, remains compelling and instantly recog-
nizable to people in the region: Globalization in the Paciﬁc Islands is inter-
acting with cultures in ways that may not produce positive outcomes.
Rather than being predictable, the situation is complex and variable and
the outcomes are potentially negative. 
Globalization will probably widen inequalities throughout the Paciﬁc,
and some countries will beneﬁt more than others. The main reasons for
this divergence of effects are the obvious but important ones of culture,
history, politics, and demography. On the UN Human Development
Index, Papua New Guinea (137), Solomon Islands (128), and Vanuatu
(118) rank considerably lower than Fiji (92), Sämoa (74), or Tonga (54)
(hdi 2005). The Human Development Index is a rough guide at best, but
it offers an approximate indication of relative levels of development. The
outside world reached Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanu-
atu later than their neighbors and these countries consist of hundreds of
different identity groups, often smaller than the language groups that con-
tain them. Thrown together by the experience of colonial rule, they have
little else to foster a sense of common national destiny. In Fiji, Sämoa,
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Kiribati, by contrast, the modern nation-state is home
to a majority population of Paciﬁc Islanders speaking a single language,
possessing a common sense of national identity, and bound together by a
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culture of chieftainship and hierarchy that has adapted more readily to
the demands of modern government and the modern economy than have
the more egalitarian political cultures to the west (Reilly 2004). At the
same time, population growth is faster in Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and
Papua New Guinea than in Fiji, Sämoa, and Tonga. Where half the pop-
ulation has not reached adulthood, as is the case in Solomon Islands,
Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea, the challenge of increasing gross
domestic product per capita is correspondingly greater. The outlook for
labor migration also differs from one part of the Paciﬁc to another, this
time for historical and political reasons. Labor migration to wealthier
countries from Polynesia, Micronesia, and Fiji will continue, even accel-
erate, as Paciﬁc Islanders take advantage of access created by free associ-
ation agreements and earlier colonial links. Meanwhile, labor migration
from Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu—the countries
that need it most—is likely to languish. 
The weakness of the state in Melanesia outside Fiji—itself the product
of culture and history—goes a long way toward explaining why global-
ization is not enhancing the development prospects of Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Rapacious timber companies played a
part in the collapse of law and order in Solomon Islands, and continue to
undermine the integrity of its governments. The dominance of resource
exploitation in the PNG economy skews the loyalties and obligations of
the state toward foreign investors. The regional intervention in Solomon
Islands and the Enhanced Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea
are unlikely to succeed in the long term without a fresh focus on villages
and more diversiﬁed strategies for national economic development. Even
the basic promise of globalization—that it will enhance the enmeshment
of developing countries with the global economy—may not be fulﬁlled in
weak Melanesian states. 
When we ponder the globalizing changes now sweeping over the Paciﬁc
Islands region, we should remember that the economic doctrine behind
globalization is the product of Western culture and of a particular phase
in the history of the global economy. Far from being “truth” in some
objective scientiﬁc sense, the doctrine enshrines a set of highly political
policy recommendations, among them that greater inequality is to be tol-
erated for the sake of faster economic growth. We should also remember
that cultural, historical, and demographic circumstances at the receiving
end of globalization in the Island states of the Paciﬁc play determining
roles in whether the process has positive or negative consequences. 
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Abstract
Globalization is having its most transformative effects in the Paciﬁc in three
areas of economic and political life: trade, labor, and security. The global move
from protection to free trade has reached the Paciﬁc and will have its greatest
initial impact on Fiji’s sugar and garment industries, both of which face major
restructuring and possibly extinction. Within ten years, the Paciﬁc Plan might
also create economic integration within the entire Paciﬁc Islands Forum area,
though the free movement of labor from the Islands into Australia and New Zea-
land seems unlikely. Thanks in large part to the war in Iraq, Fiji has now joined
Sämoa and Tonga as a remittance economy, but Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, and Vanuatu have little access to remittance income. Globalization in
Solomon Islands has taken the form of unregulated investment in tropical log-
ging, which has contributed to corrupting the political system. The consequence
is regional intervention led by Australia, which is also attempting to shore up
Papua New Guinea, where the government’s priorities are inﬂuenced by its heavy
dependence on foreign investors in resource projects. Globalization will probably
widen inequalities throughout the Paciﬁc, and some countries will beneﬁt more
than others. Cultural, historical, and demographic circumstances at the receiving
end of globalization in the Island states of the Paciﬁc play determining roles in
whether the process has positive or negative consequences.
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